I. Introduction
The recent international financial crisis has brought to the forefront the need to improve financial regulatory and supervisory frameworks. In particular, compliance with international regulatory standards in developed countries proved inadequate to contain excessive risks taken by individual financial institutions and those generated by the financial system as a whole.
Although the distinction between risks at the individual financial institution level and at the financial system level is not new (and certainly well recognized by a number of Latin American countries, as will be discussed below), the crisis made it evident that most regulatory frameworks around the world did not adequately incorporate these differences.
Indeed, the resurgence of the terms micro prudential and macro prudential regulations is a reflection of the renewed awareness of the need to deal with both idiosyncratic (micro) and systemic (macro) risks.
This policy note focuses on provisioning practices in Latin America, a supervisory tool that if well designed can contribute to strengthen both micro and macro prudential regulation.
For that purpose the rest of this note is organized as follows: Section II briefly explains the importance of an adequate regulatory regime for provisioning requirements. Based on recent development in the literature and recommendations from international regulatory-setting bodies, the section identifies key features of an adequate provisioning regime. Section III describes the most salient characteristics of provisioning regimes in Latin America.
Information on these features was obtained through a survey to regulators from a sample of countries. Section IV constructs an index to assess the quality of the provisioning regimes in the selected countries. The construction of the index is based on recent analysis and discussions regarding the desired characteristics of regulation for provisioning requirements.
Section V concludes the paper.
II. What Constitutes Adequate Provisioning Requirements?
Following an established consensus, loan loss provisions requirements are a regulation designed to buffer the expected component of the loan-loss distribution. In contrast, minimum capital requirements should serve as a buffer for the unexpected losses. However, despite the differences provisioning and capital are quite interrelated: An inadequate classification of loans and a poor system of provisioning will result in an inadequate computation of capital.
But, what is an adequate regulatory framework for provisioning? Up to the recent financial crisis, such a system was generally defined as one that complied with good micro prudential recommendations. Since the crisis, the consensus has moved towards recognizing that, to be effective, provisioning also needs to satisfy macro prudential recommendations.
Micro prudential regulation is based on the view that banks need to correctly assess the risks that they are taking on their individual balance sheets. The fundamental reason for regulation is that in case of severe banks' difficulties the resources from a deposit insurance fund might need to be utilized. Most deposit insurances are funded (explicitly or implicitly), at least partially, with public funds. Micro prudential regulation aims at minimizing the cost to the taxpayers arising from the utilization of deposit insurances. Since the best way to minimize these costs is to insulate banks from adverse shocks, the regulatory framework focuses on requiring banks to build buffers against expected and unexpected shocks.
From this perspective, an adequate provisioning system requires that loans and other assets are correctly classified according to their risk characteristics and that the higher the riskiness of the asset, the higher the provisioning requirement. Moreover, since a number of assets, other than loans (such as contingent claims) also have a computable loss distribution, provisioning should not be restricted to loans only.
Classification of loans according to risk, for provisioning purposes, varies greatly across countries. As will be discussed below, Latin America is not an exception. While banks in a number of countries follow a pre-determined scheme of provisioning requirements according to the type of loan (such as consumer, corporate, mortgage or microfinance), others use the banks' internal models to assess the riskiness of each loan (or group of loans). In any event, a strong recommendation from sound micro prudential regulation is that the assessment of risk needs to be forward looking in that it should take into account the most important factors that determine the expected component of the loan-loss distribution. A system of provisioning based only on the number of days a loan is in arrears is not adequate.
In spite of this recommendation, a large number of countries around the world follow an incurred loss provisioning system; that is, provisioning only occurs when a loan is in arrears.
Laurin and Majnoni (2003) provide a good account of bank loan classification and provisioning practices in selected developed and emerging countries (at least until before the financial crisis).
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The approach of macro prudential regulation differs from that of micro prudential regulation. While different, the macro prudential approach aims to complement rather than substitute good regulation under the micro prudential approach.
In contrast to micro prudential regulation, whose goal is to minimize the costs to taxpayers from banking crisis resolution, the goal of macro prudential regulation is to minimize the macro costs of a crisis; that is, to limit the eruption of credit crunches derived from a systemic banking crisis. By avoiding credit crunches, macro prudential regulation aims at minimizing contractions in economic growth. Under this view, aggregate risk depends on the collective action of financial institutions. For example, uncoordinated behavior by individual banks can lead to the formation to asset bubbles that are detriment to the macro economy. Likewise, recovery of capital ratios after a crisis might lead to sharp credit contractions and severe declines in economic activity. 1 Also see Laeven and Majnoni (2003) 2 See Borio (2009) and Hanson et al (2010) From this perspective provisioning needs to be designed to avoid pro-cyclicality. 3 For that purpose, an automatic rule that triggers an increase in provisioning requirements when credit growth and/or economic growth are assessed to be excessive should be in place. In essence the rule would allow banks to accumulate loan-loss reserves that can be used in bad times. This methodology helps to prevent credit crunches since in bad times, when nonperforming loans raise sharply, banks will not be forced to increase regulatory provisioning and will, therefore, be in a better position to continue lending. Implementation of this type of regulation was pioneered by Spain in 2000, under the name of dynamic provisioning. 4 Since then, a number of Latin American countries have followed suit. 5 In 2009, after the eruption of the international financial crisis, the Financial Stability Forum recommended the establishment of dynamic provisioning.
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Another important recommendation from the macro prudential approach that affects provisioning requirement is the treatment of capital requirements. Since the goal of the macro prudential approach is to avoid credit crunches, restoration of risk-weighted capital to asset ratios in bad times needs to be done through increases in "good quality" capital rather than through asset contraction. In the macro prudential approach good capital is basically limited to common equity. Indeed, the recent recommendations on capital requirements by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the so-called Basel III) asks banks to significantly increase their holdings of common equity (as opposed to preferred stocks and other types of bank's liabilities previously accepted as capital under Basel I and II). 7 Thus, a good provisioning system should not include provisions in the computation of capital.
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In both, the macro and micro prudential approaches, the presence of a strong supervisory authority with independent powers to execute regulations and intervening banks is essential.
III. Salient Features of Provisioning Regimes in Latin America.
For the purpose of identifying the most important characteristics of provisioning regimes in Latin America we conducted a survey to supervisors and regulators in seven countries.
The countries included in this analysis were Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico and Peru and was undertaken during the first half of 2010. The survey covered a variety of features of provisioning regulations covering credit risk provisioning as well as other types of provisions, such a as provisions on the investment portfolio, contingent claims, other assets, dynamic provisions, among others. America. In some countries, such as Argentina and Mexico, the computation of provisioning for several types of loans is based on a risk classification system that only takes into account the number of days a loan is in arrears. In other countries, however, provisioning is based on forward looking models incorporating several risk factors.
Some countries have adopted dynamic provisions. In our sample Colombia and Peru have done so, adding to other countries in Latin America such as Bolivia and Uruguay. The methodologies used to compute these provisions differ across countries. While in Colombia, dynamic provisions follow more closely the Spanish model, where dynamic provisions are computed according to the behavior of each bank's credit growth performance, in Peru, they follow a macroeconomic rule. In the case of Colombia, the provisioning regime switches to a higher provisioning requirement when a bank's credit growth exceeds a pre-determined threshold (which computes the average growth over a period of time), while in Peru the regime is activated when GDP growth exceeds a threshold.
Most countries have opted to maintain some type of constant or general provision, while others have chosen not to do so, or have combined the general provision with the counter cyclical or dynamic one. Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico are cases in which the entire loan portfolio is subject to a constant provision. In Colombia only microcredit and mortgage loans are subject to a general provisioning. In this country, the computation of provisioning requirements for consumer and commercial loans is similar to the methodology used in
Brazil for all types of loans. In Brazil, there is not a constant provision requirement; instead provisioning is based the on a classification of loans according to risk derived from banks' risk models. By capturing a minimum level of risk for every type of loan, the models assign a minimum level of provision for all types of loans. 9 In Peru there is a general provision that varies according to the counter cyclical one.
9 Although the risk classification system in Brazil includes one category where a loan is considered riskless; that is, requiring no provisioning. Colombia and Ecuador, provision for contingent claims. Regarding provisioning for other assets, there is also a large variety of approaches, including the ways in which risks associated with the loss of value of fixed assets or foreclosed assets are dealt with.
An important element captured by our survey is whether regulations allow provisions to be computed as part of capital requirements. In all countries surveyed they cannot be included as part of tier 1 capital. In Argentina, Ecuador and Mexico, they can be computed as part of tier 2 capital.
IV. Assessing the Quality of Provisioning Regimes in Latin America: A Simple Index based on Current International Recommendations
The differences in provisioning regimes among Latin American countries complicate cross country comparisons in terms of the quality of the regulatory frameworks. In order to gauge an initial assessment of the quality of the provisioning regimes in the region, we
propose the construction of a simple summary index. The novelty of this index is that it is based on recent consensus on what constitutes a strong regulatory regime. As such it contains elements of both micro prudential and macro prudential regulation as discussed in Section II.
Of course, as with any index, it is important to note that the indicator has an important element of subjectivity and, therefore, the values of the index need to be interpreted as indicative only.
The proposed index is formed by four components. Two components relate to sound micro prudential regulation; the other two support strong macro prudential regulation.
Let us start with the components that relate to micro prudential regulation. As discussed above, sound micro prudential regulation provides incentives for individual banks to correctly internalize the risks derived from their activities. In this regard, the first component of the index measures the extent to which loan loss provisions are forward looking, i.e. that they are calculated based on the expectation of a loss and not solely on the observed deleterious behavior of a loan (arrears). We call this component of the index the credit risk component, and it takes a value between 0 and 1. If the regulation for provisioning requirement does not allow for forward looking criteria at all, this sub-index takes a value of 0. If, instead the regulation allows for forward looking criteria in the computation of provisions for consumer, commercial, mortgage and microcredit loans, the sub-index takes a value of 1. Starting from zero, the sub-index adds a value of 0.25 for every type of loan (among the four types mentioned above) that is provisioned using forward looking criteria. We now turn to the components of the index that relate to the macro prudential approach.
As discussed above, under the macro prudential approach provisioning should be designed to Our final index is a simple average of the credit risk, other assets, counter cyclical, and capital components described above. Figure 1 plots the index constructed following this methodology for the countries in our sample.
Consistent with the large differences in provisioning regimes in Latin America, the value of the index varies significantly among the countries in our sample. Relative to our definition of a sound provisioning system, Colombia and Peru outperform the rest of countries in the sample. Interestingly enough, the provisioning regimes in these two countries are very close to our characterization of a sound provisioning system (that is, the index takes a value not far from 1). An important reason for this result is that, as discussed above, these two countries 
Concluding Remarks
The recent international financial crisis has brought an enormous amount of attention to the need for an improved financial regulatory framework. While it is not unusual to observe changes in regulation following a crisis, a relevant question for Latin America is how the region fares regarding proposed improvements in regulation. This note has focused on provisioning requirements, a supervisory tool that is capable to deal with issues raised by the so-called micro prudential approach to regulation, as well as with the challenges uncovered by the macro prudential regulation approach.
Based on some key recommendations from both approaches regarding the implementation of a sound provisioning regime, we construct a simple index that we use to assess the quality of the provisioning requirements in a sample of countries from Latin America. Not surprisingly the results are quite diverse across countries. However, an important result that deserves emphasis is that a number of countries are in good standing; with the value of the index quite close to its maximum value.
Further research in this area is certainly needed. In particular two issues deserve greater scrutiny. The first is the need to improve the index to include additional factors, such as the quality of the supervisory authorities that assess compliance with the regulatory regime on provisioning, or the tax treatment on loan-loss provisioning. The second is to extend the analysis to incorporate additional supervisory tools.
